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I. INTRODUCTION
The private equity market is a major source of capital in the United
States. In 1998, organized private equity firms raised over $85.3 billion.'
These firms are very interested in media investing. For example, one pri-
vate equity firm, Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst, recently financed the $2.1
billion purchase of SFX Broadcasting and the $1.7 billion purchase of LIN
Television. Private equity financing is important to all sizes and types of
media companies. Much of the rapid growth of the Internet has been fi-
nanced by private equity.
The two defining characteristics of the private equity market are in its
name. First, it is structured as equity or near equity (e.g., subordinated debt
with warrants) investment, not debt. The investor is at significant risk and
is looking for long-term capital appreciation. Second, it is an investment in
an unregistered (private) security that cannot be purchased or sold in the
public market.
Private equity is one of the most expensive forms of finance. Thus,
companies that raise private equity tend to be those that are unable to raise
funds in other markets such as the bank loan, private debt placement, or
public equity markets. Many of these companies are simply too risky to be
able to issue debt or need funds beyond prudent debt levels. Investment in
these companies may also require a large amount of investigation on the
part of potential investors because little public information is available,
and there are unique risks involved. The companies may also need investor
guidance and expertise in developing their business. The private equity
market, where a large investor can take the time and effort to understand
such risks and may exert some influence over management in return for its
investment,3 may be the only viable alternative.
From the perspective of an entrepreneur or top manager, being part of
a company financed by private equity is often far more attractive than be-
ing part of a subsidiary of a large company. The private equity investor
1. Juan Hovey, Small Business Finance and Insurance: Brighter Outlook for Private
Equity Funding for Small Firms, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1999, at C5.
2. Mitchell Schnurman, Hicks Muse Has a Taste for Food Acquisitions, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAPH, Sept. 24, 1997, at B1.
3. See generally Vance H. Fried & Robert D. Hisrich, The Venture Capitalist: A Re-
lationship Investor, 37 CAL. MGMT. REV. 101, 101-02 (1995).
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allows them to have a significant economic stake in the business. They are
co-owners, not just employees. In addition, private equity investors give
them much more control over their company. Private equity investors gen-
erally try to stay removed from day-to-day operations. Private equity in-
vestors function like active board members, not like a chief executive offi-
cer and headquarters' staff.4 While private equity investors may have
investments in several different companies, these companies are usually
allowed to operate totally independent of each other.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET'
Sometimes a private equity investment is made directly by an inves-
tor in a company issuing the stock. However the bulk of private equity
comes through the organized private equity market. In this market, an in-
termediary organizes investors and makes investments on their behalf in
the issuing company. Figure 1 presents an overview of the organized pri-
vate equity market.
A. Issuers
Issuers in the private equity market vary widely in size and their rea-
sons for raising capital, as well as in other ways. Issuers of traditional
venture capital are young companies, often developing innovative tech-
nologies, projected to show very high growth rates. They may be early-
stage companies still in the research and development stage or the earliest
stages of commercialization, or later-stage companies that have several
years of sales but are still trying to grow rapidly.
Since the mid-1980s, nonventure private equity investment has out-
paced venture investment. Middle-market companies, roughly defmed as
companies with annual sales of $25 million to $500 million, have become
increasingly attractive to private equity investors.
Public companies also are issuers in the private equity market. Public
companies that go private issue a combination of debt and private equity to
finance their buyout. Public companies also issue private equity to help
them through periods of financial distress and to avoid the disclosures as-
sociated with public offerings.
4. See id. at 103-04, 109-10; Vance H. Fried & George D. Bruton, The Involvement of
the Board of Directors in Portfolio Company Strategy, 1 J. PRIVATE EQurry 51, 51-55
(1998); Vance H. Fried et al., Strategy and the Board of Directors in Venture Capital-
Backed Firms, 13 J. Bus. VENTURING 493, 494-95 (1998).
5. Much of the material in this Part comes from a general description of the private
equity market appearing in GEORGE W. FENN ET AL., THE EcONOMICS OF THE PRIVATE
EQUITY MARKET (Federal Reserve 1995), which has been modified by the Author to em-
phasize minority media.
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B. Intermediaries
Intermediaries-mainly limited partnerships 6-manage an estimated
80 percent of private equity investments. Investors are the limited partners.
Professional private equity managers, working through a partnership man-
agement firm, are the general partners. Limited partnerships have a ten-
year life, during which investors give virtually all control over the man-
agement of the partnership to the general partners. The general partners are
paid an annual management fee but receive a significant amount of their
compensation in the form of shares in the partnership's profits.
6. Limited liability companies are becoming popular as a legal structure. In practice,
limited partnerships and limited liability companies operate in an almost identical manner.
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Slightly different from traditional partnerships are Small Business
Investment Companies (SBICs). Small Business Investment Companies
can leverage investor capital with federal government capital through the
Small Business Administration (SBA). Today, SBICs play a small role in
the overall private equity market, accounting for less than 1 percent of to-
tal industry capital. However, one type of SBIC, the Specialized Small
Business Investment Company (SSBIC), may be a very important source
of financing for minority media. By their charter, SSBICs are required to
invest in businesses owned by the socially or economically disadvantaged.
C. Investors
A variety of groups invest in the private equity market. Public and
corporate pension funds are the largest investor group, providing about 50
percent of the capital. Pension funds are followed by endowments and
foundations, bank holding companies, and wealthy families and individu-
als, each of which holds about 10 percent of total private equity. Insurance
companies, investment banks, nonfinancial corporations, and foreign in-
vestors are the remaining major investor groups. The federal government
is also a supplier of capital through the SBIC program.
Most institutional investors invest in private equity for strictly finan-
cial reasons. They expect the risk-adjusted returns on private equity to be
higher than the risk-adjusted returns on other investments, and they want
to diversify their portfolio by asset class.7 While SSBICs receive funding
through the federal government and are required to invest in minority-
owned businesses, the program is designed so that the private investors in
the SSBIC are financially driven.
D. Industry Segments
Private equity firms have largely segmented the market based upon
characteristics of the companies in which they are investing. The primary
characteristics are age, size, and reason for seeking equity. Although the
boundaries between segments are not precise, most private equity firms
will specialize in one, or sometimes two, of these segments.
1. Early-Stage New Ventures
Early-stage venture capital goes to small companies wishing to grow
rapidly. Examples of media companies at an early stage are a new Web
7. See Vance H. Fried & Robert D. Hisrich, Venture Capital from the Investors' Per-
spective, in FRONTERS OF ENTREPRENEuRSHIP RESEARCH 258, 260 (Robert H. Bockhaus, Sr.
et al. eds., 1989) (discussing why and how investors participate in private equities).
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site, a start-up cable channel, or a developer of new broadcasting equip-
ment. Early-stage new ventures vary somewhat in size, age, and reasons
for seeking external capital. The smallest type of venture in this category is
the entrepreneur who needs financing to conduct research and develop-
ment to determine whether a business concept deserves further financing.
The concept may involve a new technology or merely a new marketing ap-
proach. Financing may be needed to build a prototype, conduct a market
survey, or bring together a formal business plan and recruit management.
A somewhat more mature type of company in the early-stage cate-
gory already has some evidence that production on a commercial scale is
feasible and that there is a market for the product. Such companies need
financing primarily to set up initial manufacturing and distribution capa-
bilities so they can sell their product on a commercial scale. Slightly more
mature companies may already have basic manufacturing and distribution
capabilities but need to expand them and to finance inventories or receiv-
ables. The most mature of the early-stage companies are starting to turn
profits, but their need for working and expansion capital is rising faster
than their cash flow.
Early-stage venture investments are by their nature small and illiquid.
A typical early-stage investment might range from $500,000 to fund the
development of a prototype to $2 million to finance the start-up of an op-
erating company. Investors in early-stage ventures recognize that their in-
vestments are for the long term and that they may be unable to liquidate
them for many years, even if the venture is successful. Because of their
high risk and low liquidity, early-stage venture investments carry high re-
quired returns. The discount rate that investors apply to such investments
range from 35 to 70 percent per annum.
2. Later-Stage New Ventures
Companies that need later-stage venture funds have less uncertainty
associated with the feasibility of their business concept. They have a
proven technology and a proven market for their product. They are typi-
cally growing fast and generating profits. They generally need private eq-
uity financing to add capacity to sustain their fast growth.
Generally, later-stage venture investments are larger than early-stage
investments, ranging from $2 million to $5 million, and are held for a
shorter term simply because the firm is closer to going public or being
sold. Because the risk is generally lower and the liquidity higher, later-
stage investments carry somewhat lower required returns than early-stage
investments, generally ranging from 25 to 35 percent.
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3. Middle-Market Private Companies
Many existing television or radio broadcasting companies fit into the
middle-market segment. Middle-market private companies differ in a
number of ways from companies seeking venture capital. First, they are
generally well established, having been founded decades, rather than years
or months, earlier. Second, with annual revenues ranging from $25 million
to $500 million, they are typically much larger than early-stage new ven-
tures and are in most cases larger than later-stage new ventures. Third,
they are often in more mature industries. Fourth, most have much more
stable cash flows and much lower growth rates than companies seeking
venture finance. Finally, they typically have a significant asset base to bor-
row against. Consequently, they almost always have access to bank loans.
Some of the larger companies in this category may also have access to the
private placement bond market.
These companies seek private equity for two primary objectives: to
effect a change in ownership or capital structure or to finance an expan-
sion. Although these companies typically have access to bank loans, they
often cannot meet their financing needs entirely through debt.
All closely held private companies eventually face the issue of suc-
cession of the current management team or the liquidity needs of existing
owners. Resolution of the issue typically requires that the company be sold
to the heirs of the founding family or to a new management team. In either
case, funds must be available to cash out the existing owners. In addition,
private equity is used to finance an ownership change when a subsidiary is
spun out of a large corporation. Typically, a private equity limited partner-
ship organizes the financing of an ownership change with a combination of
private equity and debt (often with multiple tranches).
The purchase of major plant and equipment is a common reason to
seek external financing. Certainly many broadcasting companies need
money for significant equipment upgrades. In addition, private equity can
fund acquisitions. Much of the recent consolidation in both radio and tele-
vision broadcasting has been funded through the private equity market.
Just as the typical middle-market company is larger than a firm
seeking venture capital, the investments are also larger, typically ranging
from $10 million to $100 million. Discount rates for the equity portion of a
leveraged buyout are similar to those for late-stage venture investing. Dis-
count rates may be lower on other types of middle-market financing.
Many private equity partnerships invest strictly in middle-market
firms, although many partnerships that specialize in later-stage ventures
also finance such deals on a regular basis. They will often invest in smaller
transactions and generally look for situations where there is significant
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room for earnings growth after the acquisition. Many SSBICs fall into this
category.
4. Companies in Financial Distress
Private and public companies that are in financial distress make up
another group of issuers in the private equity market. Most turnaround
partnerships target firms with financial problems that arose simply from
being overleveraged-that is, they show positive earnings before interest
and taxes (EBIT); a smaller number also invest in firms with definable op-
erating and management problems that are showing negative EBIT. Re-
quired returns are high, reflecting the risky nature of the activity, with dis-
count rates from 30 to 40 percent.
5. Public Companies
Along with venture capital, buyouts of large public companies are
probably the most publicized use of private equity. Recent media examples
include the activities of Hicks Muse through Chancellor and CapStar, and
Kohlberg Kravis through PrimeMedia. Companies that undergo public
buyouts typically have moderate or even slow growth rates and stable cash
flows.
In addition to buyouts, there are a variety of other reasons why a
public company might use private equity. Some are raising funds to fi-
nance activities, such as planned acquisitions, that they want to keep con-
fidential. Others are pursuing complex business strategies that public retail
investors would not be comfortable with, and that require analysis by a
large, sophisticated private investor.
Still others use the private equity market due to a temporary inter-
ruption of access to the public equity market. Retail and institutional in-
vestors may have a herd mentality in viewing the prospects of particular
industrial sectors. For example, cable television companies found it almost
impossible to issue equity publicly in 1992, and turned to the private mar-
ket to meet their needs.
III. INVESTMENT CRITERIA"
While there are significant differences between private equity firms,
there is a fairly common set of criteria they use in assessing an investment,
no matter what the industry. These criteria can be grouped into three cate-
8. The material in the next two sections is largely based upon B. Elango et al., How
Venture Capital Firms Differ, 10 J. Bus. VENTURING 157 (1995); Vance H. Fried & Robert
D. Hisrich, Toward a Model of Venture Capital Investment Decision Making, 23 FIN.
MGMT. 28 (1994) [hereinafter Fried & Hisrich, Model of Decision Making].
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gories-concept, management, and returns. Concept has four components.
First, the investment must be in a firm where there is significant potential
for earnings growth.9 This is obvious for early-stage ventures, which may
not even be generating revenues, but it is also important for later-stage in-
vestments. It is difficult, if not impossible, to get venture capital rates of
return without significant earnings growth. Certainly, a rapidly growing
market may increase the likelihood of earnings growth, but many late-
stage venture capitalists (VCs)' ° are also interested in earnings growth
through increasing market share or significant cost cutting. Investors in
broadcasting companies often look to improve earnings through better
management and/or economies of scale through consolidation of station
operations.
Second, the investment must involve a business idea (new product,
service, retail concept, etc.) that either already works or can be brought to
market within two to three years. Even early-stage venture capital firms
(VCFs) are not interested in financing basic research. They want ideas that
are ready to be commercialized.
Third, the concept must offer a substantial "competitive advantage"
or be in a relatively noncompetitive industry. Not only must the concept be
sound, but it must be achievable in the face of actual or potential competi-
tion. One of the attractions of broadcasting companies is that the industry
is relatively noncompetitive with large profit margins. Minority ownership
might be seen as a plus if it gives actual competitive advantage in a mar-
ket.
Fourth, the concept must have reasonable overall capital require-
ments. The amount of money available in the private equity market and the
initial public offering market is cyclical. When the environment in these
capital markets is harsh, VCs look for concepts where the total cash re-
quirement to achieve self funding is within the reach of the VC and his
original investment group. If not, the original investment group is subject
to being washed out in subsequent fmancings even if the company has
done moderately well. In addition, excessively high capital requirements
drive down return on investment (ROD.
Management is also an important consideration. There are several at-
tributes VCs want managers to possess. First, managers must display per-
sonal integrity. The VC is entrusting management with a great deal of
money. The VC does not monitor management on a daily basis. Once an
9. The potential for major earnings growth is much less of an issue for middle-market
and public company financings.
10. For simplicity, managers of any type of private equity partnership will be referred
to as VCs in the rest of this Article.
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investment is made, the VC is very dependent on the management. It is
vital that the VC trust management to deal honestly and fairly with inves-
tors.
Second, management needs to have done well at prior jobs. The track
record does not have to be with the current company. Association with
losing ventures in the past does not disqualify the entrepreneur if he can
show that he personally performed well in the earlier venture. In later-
stage investments, the focus tends to be more on performance on the cur-
rent job.
Management must be realistic. Venture capitalists know that there
are risks with their investment. Venture capitalists try to judge the man-
ager's ability to identify risk and, where appropriate, develop plans for
dealing with these risks. Management also needs to be hardworking, flexi-
ble, and have a thorough understanding of the business. Flexibility is espe-
cially important for early-stage ventures.
Management must also exhibit leadership. This includes not only the
ability to lead in good times but also under extreme pressure. Finally,
management must have general management experience. Management's
leadership capabilities and general management experience may not be as
significant in an early-stage venture as long as the entrepreneur is willing
to add additional management, possibly at the CEO level, to correct this
deficiency.
Return has three components. First, the investment must provide an
exit opportunity. Venture capitalists generally exit their investments by a
public offering, sale of the company, or a buyback of the VC investment
by the company. Venture capitalists do not expect easy liquidity. Rather,
they require the likelihood of some type of exit, but in a two to seven-year
period.
Second, as the prior discussion of industry segments shows, the in-
vestment must offer the potential for a high rate of return. The investment
must also offer the potential for a high absolute return. Small investments
take as much VC time as large. Venture capitalists view their time as valu-
able and are not willing to spend it on small investments that offer low ab-
solute returns, even if the rate of return is high. This is why VCFs have
minimum investment levels.
These are broad generic criteria. The specifics of each criteria may
vary from VCF to VCF. Even if two VCs have the same criteria, there may
be major differences in their judgment as to how well a particular invest-
ment proposal meets these criteria.
[Vol. 51
PRIVATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP
IV. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Investment decisions are made for a partnership by its general part-
ners and their management firm. The limited partners rarely have any role
in the investment decision. The management firms are very small, very flat
organizations. For example, a firm managing $50 million in early-stage
venture capital would typically have three general partners, one or two as-
sociates, and three administrative assistants. Rarely will a private equity
firm have more than twenty employees and two layers of management.
The decision-making process can be modeled in six stages as shown
in Figure 2. The process is time-consuming and labor intensive. It tradi-
tionally takes three to four months for an investment to pass through these
six stages and receive funding; currently, however, the time frame is often
shorter. In the case of financing for a change in station ownership, there
may be an additional period to be spent awaiting Federal Communications
Commission approval. On projects where they are a lead investor, early
stage VCFs spend about ninety man hours on a proposal to get all the way
through the process. Late-stage VCFs may take over 300 hours.
A. Origination
The first phase is origination. While VCs generally wait for deals to
come to them, they do make themselves known to companies through in-
dustry directories. The bulk of the VC's efforts to generate investment
proposals focuses on developing a network of referents. While VCs re-
ceive many deals "cold" (without any introduction), they rarely invest in
them. Most funded proposals are referred to the VC. Occasionally, the VC
already knows the founder either through involvement in the management
of one of the VC's prior investments or consulting work done for the VC.
Referred deals come from a variety of sources: investment bankers,
investors in the VC's fund, commercial bankers, management of firms in
the VC's portfolio, consultants who had worked for the VC in the past, and
family friends. There are two reasons for this heavy dependence on refer-
rals. First, the VC may place some confidence in the referent's judgment.
Second, the referent is more likely to understand what type of investments
the VC might find attractive.
Growing minorities of VCs aggressively seek out deals and in some
cases may actually help create them. A common strategy for VCFs seeking
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to participate in any industry consolidation (e.g., radio or television broad-
casting) is to find a top manager from that industry, then give him a
checkbook with which to acquire existing companies in the industry.
B. Firm-Specific Screen
Many VCFs have firm-specific criteria on investment size, industries
in which they invest, geographic location of the investment, and stage of
financing. The firm-specific screen eliminates proposals that clearly do not
meet these criteria. At most, the firm-specific screen involves a cursory
glance at the business plan without any analysis of the proposal.
C. Generic Screen
Most of the deals that get through the firm-specific screen fail to
make it through the generic screen. The generic screen is particularly bru-
tal on early-stage ventures, eliminating 80 to 90 percent of the deals. In the
generic screen, the VCF quickly analyzes the proposed investment to get a
rough idea as to the likelihood that the investment meets the generic crite-
ria discussed earlier. Deals are rejected at the generic screen based upon a
reading of the business plan coupled with any existing knowledge the VC
may have relevant to the proposal.
D. First-Phase Evaluation
After proposals pass through the generic screen, the VC begins to
gather additional information about the proposal. Extensive information is
gathered from both company and outside sources. After clearing the ge-
neric screen, the proposal's progress through the remaining stages is not a
smooth flow as is indicated by the wavy line in Figure 2. As one VC has
commented: "It's not a nice slow curve where you sort of get mildly inter-
ested and then come to a crescendo at the end. It's more the other way
around. And you have peaks and valleys in the middle.""
The first-phase evaluation generally starts with a meeting with the
principals of the company seeking financing. As the proposal is being
evaluated, a series of meetings with all the top management team will oc-
cur. These meetings have two goals: to increase the VC's understanding of
the business and to allow the VC to assess the company's management in
terms of the management's understanding of its industry, its proposal, and
the problems it may encounter. It also provides an opportunity to assess
11. Fried & Hisrich, Model of Decision Making, supra note 8, at 32 (quoting an un-
named VC).
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how management thinks and behaves. The meetings also provide an op-
portunity to assess the ability of management to react under pressure.
Management's abilities are also assessed by checking the list of ref-
erences provided, as well as other references not identified by the entre-
preneur. The extent of reference checking will vary considerably based
primarily on the VC's prior knowledge of the entrepreneur.
Late-stage and buyout investors are more likely to talk to accountants
than early-stage investors reflecting the financial history available. Infor-
mation availability also leads late-stage investors to engage more fre-
quently in library research. Late-stage investors are also more likely to talk
to banks, but banks are not viewed as particularly frank sources, especially
if owed money. Both existing and potential customers are contacted to de-
termine why they are buying or not buying from the company. Similarly,
early-stage investors may contact potential customers before the product
has been fully developed.
Formal market studies may also be made, sometimes by outside con-
sultants. Most of the time, VCFs invest without a formal market study.
This occurs for several reasons. First, a great deal of information is almost
always in the business plan. Second, the contacts with customers and po-
tential customers provide additional information. Third, sometimes the
market is not clearly defined. Certainly that is the case for most Internet
investments being made today. Formal market studies for breakthrough
products can be incredibly inaccurate. For example, in 1950, the best mar-
ket research predicted the annual market demand for computers would be
about 1,000 units by the year 2000.12
Technical studies of the product are used much more by early-stage
investors than late-stage, since late-stage investors can get a good feel for
the state of the company's technology by talking with customers and in-
dustry experts. Early-stage investors do technological evaluation in a vari-
ety of ways. Several early-stage investors have formal affiliations with
technology experts, while other VCFs handle technology assessment on an
informal, ad hoc basis.
Venture capitalists often discuss the potential investment with the
management of some of their existing portfolio companies, particularly
those that are in industries closely related to the industry being considered.
These portfolio companies might also be customers or potential customers,
or suppliers or potential suppliers, of the company being considered for in-
vestment and can provide valuable information.
12. PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: PRACTICE AND PRIN-
CIPLES 191 (1985).
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Venture capitalists, particularly doing early-stage investing, also may
talk to each other. Because of their experience with proposals they have
analyzed and investments they have made, VCs may have knowledge that
might be useful to one another. Venture capital firms have traditionally in-
vested through loose syndicates. To some extent, this is to pool capital in
order to share risk and increase the absolute amount of capital that can be
invested in any one company. However, these syndicates are also formed
in order to share knowledge.
Venture capitalists analyze pro forma financial projections prepared
by the company to assess the potential for earnings growth. This analysis
also provides an understanding of the business concept and information
about management's understanding of the proposal and its realism toward
its future. The financial projections also provide the basis on which to es-
timate the potential value that can be received at exit. Late-stage invest-
ments have more historical financial information available, which allows a
more meaningful analysis.
E. Second-Phase Evaluation
At some point the VCF may develop an "emotional" commitment to
the proposal. This marks the start of the second phase of the evaluation
process. In this phase, the amount of VCF time spent on the proposal in-
creases dramatically, and the VCF's goal changes. While in the first phase
the goal is to determine if there is serious interest in the deal, in the second
phase, the object is to determine if there are any obstacles to doing the
deal, and if so, how they can be overcome. This second phase is often re-
ferred to in the industry as due diligence, although the degree to which
VCFs formally recognize the movement of a deal from first phase to sec-
ond phase varies greatly.
Because of the significant amount of time spent in the second phase,
VCFs like to have at least a rough understanding about the structure of the
deal, including price, before entering this phase. This understanding is
usually expressed in a nonbinding "term sheet," which both VCF and is-
suer sign. This keeps the VCF from devoting significant time to evaluating
proposals that ultimately will not be investable because they are priced too
high.
F. Closing
After progressing through the second-phase evaluation, the proposal
enters the closing stage, where the details of the structure are finalized and
legal documents negotiated. After the documents are signed, a check is
given to the company. Even though both VCF and entrepreneur have in-
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vested large amounts of time to get to this final stage, a surprising number
of deals (perhaps 20 percent) that reach this stage are not funded.
G. Proposals with Serious Problems
As Figure 2 indicates, a proposal can be rejected at any stage in the
process. The VCF has four options when faced with a problem in the pro-
posal. First, the deal may be further investigated. Sometimes deals that are
almost rejected by the VCF at the generic screen are ultimately funded af-
ter further investigation.
Second, the VCF can mandate that some significant changes in the
original proposal be made. It is not unusual for new members of the top
management team to be added as a condition of funding. Third, occasion-
ally the VCF may simply go ahead and do the deal even though some seri-
ous concerns are present.
Finally, the most common response, by far, is to reject the deal. In-
terestingly, sometimes proposals that have been previously rejected reap-
pear in a somewhat different form and are accepted.
V. POSSIBILITIES AND PROBLEMS FOR MINORITY MEDIA
The private equity market is an important source of funds for minor-
ity media companies. It is a large market, able to meet a variety of financ-
ing needs. Many in the market are very interested in media companies.
This includes minority-owned media.
However, the minority media entrepreneur must realize that this is
strictly a profit-oriented investment market. The same investment process
and criteria will be applied to minority media proposals as will be applied
to non-minority media proposals. This process may present some problems
for minority entrepreneurs since most private equity investors are not mi-
norities.
First, most private equity investments are originated by referral. To
be referred, the entrepreneur needs connections with appropriate informal
business networks. This is a problem for many entrepreneurs and may be
especially problematic for a minority entrepreneur coming from a disad-
vantaged economic background.
Second, as with any communication, the sender needs to understand
the recipient's thought process and tailor his message accordingly. Many
entrepreneurs struggle in this regard. Because of cultural differences, this
may be a particular problem for some minority entrepreneurs.
Third, to the extent the concept (not ownership) is minority targeted,
some white investors may feel that they have an inadequate experience
base against which to analyze the investment. As a result, they may choose
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to spend their time looking at proposals that they can understand more
easily.
Finally, a proposal on the margin may be declined with a minority
entrepreneur and accepted with a white entrepreneur. This is due to an un-
conscious, but real, bias in decision making whereby those similar to the
decision maker are viewed more positively. While there is no research
specifically investigating the existence of this bias in private equity set-
tings, it has been shown to exist in other decision-making research. From
the perspective of Signal Detection Theory, 3 the investor in the model
spends his time in the evaluation stages looking for a "signal" to invest.
Whether or not the investor identifies the proposal as a viable investment
is primarily a function of the level of the signal (evidence supporting the
proposal) the investor receives, the amount of noise (irrelevant informa-
tion), and the bias of the decision maker.
As used in Signal Detection Theory, bias refers to the threshold
amount of evidence required for a proposal to be viewed as viable. One
factor that may influence bias is the similarity of the entrepreneur to the
investor. Thus, a white private equity investor may interpret the same sig-
nal as positive when sent by a white entrepreneur and negative when sent
by a minority entrepreneur. That is, more evidence of a viable proposal
may be required from a minority entrepreneur. Decision-maker bias is not
deliberate; rather, it is an unconscious factor that influences decision
making.
However, the similarities bias problem may not be that significant.
First, race is not the only way in which people can be similar. Some mi-
nority entrepreneurs may have many similarities with private equity in-
vestors-for example, education, work experience, hometown, among
other things. Second, an investor who is aware of this subconscious bias
may make a conscious effort to compensate for the bias. Most importantly,
bias is not the primary factor in making the decision. It only works on the
margin. The primary factor is the level of the signal (evidence supporting
the proposal).
Thus, while there are some potential problems for minority entrepre-
neurs, they need not be insurmountable for a quality proposal. In addition,
SSBICs exist specifically to invest in minority-owned companies. Today,
minority-focused private equity firms manage over $1.4 billion. While
most were started with preferential financing through the SBA, several
13. DAVID M. GREEN & JOHN A. SwErs, SIGNAL DETECION THEORY AND PSYCHO-
PHYSICS (1966).
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have been successful enough to raise significant additional funds without
SBA assistance. 4
Tying into the model presented earlier, minority-focused investors
have a firm-specific screen that they only invest with minority entrepre-
neurs. Otherwise, they are just like any other private equity firm. They will
use the same process and criteria.
The minority entrepreneur should always remember what one leading
minority-focused venture fund refers to as the key fact of venture capital:
"You will be seeking a yes answer in a no business."' 5 Few proposals, mi-
nority or otherwise, make it all the way through the investment process. To
be successful, the entrepreneur must be good and persistent.
14. See Jeffrey A. Tannenbaum, Where the Money Isn't, WALL ST. J., May 21, 1998, at
R20.
15. Pacesetter Growth Fund, L.P./MESBIC Ventures Holding Company, Key Facts
About Raising Venture Capital (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.mvhc.com/facts.htm>.
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